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Abstract. Quantitative verification techniques have been developed for
the formal analysis of a variety of probabilistic models, such as Markov
chains, Markov decision process and their variants. They can be used to
produce guarantees on quantitative aspects of system behaviour, for ex-
ample safety, reliability and performance, or to help synthesise controllers
that ensure such guarantees are met. We propose the model of turn-based
probabilistic timed multi-player games, which incorporates probabilistic
choice, real-time clocks and nondeterministic behaviour across multiple
players. Building on the digital clocks approach for the simpler model
of probabilistic timed automata, we show how to compute the key mea-
sures that underlie quantitative verification, namely the probability and
expected cumulative price to reach a target. We illustrate this on case
studies from computer security and task scheduling.
1 Introduction
Probability is a crucial tool for modelling computerised systems. We can use it to
model uncertainty, for example in the operating environment of an autonomous
vehicle or a wireless sensor network, and we can reason about systems that use
randomisation, from probabilistic routing in anonymity network protocols to
symmetry breaking in communication protocols.
Formal verification of such systems can provide us with rigorous guarantees
on, for example, the performance and reliability of computer networks [7], the
amount of inadvertent information leakage by a security protocol [5], or the
safety level of an airbag control system [2]. To do so requires us to model and
reason about a range of quantitative aspects of a system’s behaviour: probability,
time, resource usage, and many others.
Quantitative verification techniques have been developed for a wide range of
probabilistic models. The simplest are Markov chains, which model the evolu-
tion of a stochastic system over discrete time. Markov decision processes (MDPs)
additionally include nondeterminism, which can be used either to model the un-
controllable behaviour of an adversary or to determine an optimal strategy (or
policy) for controlling the system. Generalising this model further still, we can
add a notion of real time, yielding the model of probabilistic timed automata
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(PTAs). This is done in the same way as for the widely used model of timed au-
tomata (TAs), adding real-valued variables called clocks to the model. Tools such
as PRISM [34] and Storm [21] support verification of a wide range of properties
of these different probabilistic models.
Another dimension that we can add to these models and verification tech-
niques is game-theoretic aspects. These can be used to represent, for example,
the interaction between an attacker and a defender in a computer security pro-
tocol [4], between a controller and its environment, or between participants in a
communication protocol who have opposing goals [28]. Stochastic multi-player
games include choices made by multiple players who can either collaborate or
compete to achieve their goals. Tool support for verification of stochastic games,
e.g. PRISM-games [41], has also been developed and deployed successfully in a
variety of application domains.
In this paper, we consider a modelling formalism that captures all these
aspects: probability, nondeterminism, time and multiple players. We define a
model called turn-based probabilistic timed multi-player games (TPTGs), which
can be seen as either an extension of PTAs to incorporate multiple players, or
a generalisation of stochastic multi-player games to include time. Building on
known techniques for the simpler classes of models, we show how to compute
key properties of these models, namely probabilistic reachability (the probability
of reaching a set of target states) and expected price reachability (the expected
price accumulated before reaching a set of target states).
Existing techniques for PTAs largely fall into two classes: zone-based and
digital clocks, both of which construct and analyse a finite-state abstraction
of the model. Zones are symbolic expressions representing sets of clock values.
Zone-based approaches for analysing PTAs were first introduced in [39,40,33] and
recent work extended them to the analysis of expected time [29] and expected
price reachability [35]. The digital clocks approach works by mapping real-valued
clocks to integer-valued ones, reducing the problem of solving a PTA to solving a
(discrete-time) MDP. This approach was developed for PTAs in [38] and recently
extended to the analysis of partially observable PTAs in [46].
In this paper, we show how a similar idea can be used to reduce the verifi-
cation problem for TPTGs to an equivalent one over (discrete-time) stochastic
games. More precisely, for the latter, we use turn-based stochastic games (TSGs).
We first present the model of TPTGs and give two alternative semantics: one us-
ing real-valued clocks and the other using (integer-valued) digital clocks. Then,
we prove the correspondence between these two semantics. Next, we demonstrate
the application of this approach to two case studies from the domains of com-
puter security and task scheduling. Using a translation from TPTGs to TSGs
and the model checking tool PRISM-games, we show that a variety of useful
properties can be studied on these case studies.
Related Work. Timed games were introduced and shown to be decidable
in [43,6,1]. These games have since been extensively studied; we mention [52,19],
where efficient algorithms are investigated, and [47], which concerns the synthe-
sis of strategies that are robust to stochastic perturbation in clock values. Also
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related is the tool UPPAAL TIGA [8], which allows the automated analysis of
reachability and safety problems for timed games.
Priced (or weighted) timed games were introduced in [49,3,11], which extend
timed games by associating integer costs with locations and transitions, and
optimal cost reachability was shown to be decidable under certain restrictions.
The problem has since been shown to be undecidable for games with three or
more clocks [17,10]. Priced timed games have recently been extended to allow
partial observability [18] and to energy games [14].
Two-player (concurrent) probabilistic timed games were introduced in [24].
The authors demonstrated that such games are not determined (even when all
clock constraints are closed) and investigated the complexity of expected time
reachability for such games. Stochastic timed games [13,16] are turn-based games
where time delays are exponentially distributed. A similar model, based on in-
teractive Markov chains [27], is considered in [15].
2 Background
We start with some background and notation on turn-based stochastic games
(TSGs). For a set X, let Dist(X) denote the set of discrete probability distribu-
tions over X and R the set of non-negative real numbers.
Definition 1 (Turn-based stochastic multi-player game). A turn-based
stochastic multi-player game (TSG) is a tuple G=(Π,S, s¯,A, 〈Si〉i∈Π , δ, R) where
Π is a finite set of players, S is a (possibly infinite) set of states, s¯ ∈ S is
an initial state, A is a (possibly infinite) set of actions, 〈Si〉i∈Π is a partition
of the state space, δ : S×A → Dist(S) is a (partial) transition function and
R : S×A→ R is a price (or reward) function.
The transition function is partial in the sense that δ need not be defined for all
state-action pairs. For each state s of a TSG G, there is a set of available actions
given by A(s)
def
= {a ∈ A | δ(s, a) is defined}. The choice of which available
action is taken in state s is under the control of a single player: the player i
such that s ∈ Si. If player i selects action a ∈ A(s) in s, then the probability of
transitioning to state s′ equals δ(s, a)(s′) and a price of R(s, a) is accumulated.
Paths and strategies. A path of a TSG G is a sequence pi = s0
a0−→ s1 a1−→ · · ·
such that si ∈ S, ai ∈ A(si) and δ(si, ai)(si+1)>0 for all i>0. For a path pi, we
denote by pi(i) the (i+1)th state of the path, pi[i] the action associated with the
(i+1)th transition and, if pi is finite, last(pi) the final state. The length of a path
pi, denoted |pi|, equals the number of transitions. For a path pi and k<|pi|, let
pi(k) be the kth prefix of pi. Let FPathsG and IPathsG equal the sets of finite and
infinite paths starting in the initial state s¯.
A strategy for player i ∈ Π is a way of resolving the choice of action in
each state under the control of player i, based on the game’s execution so far.
Formally, a strategy σ for player i ∈ Π is a function σi : {pi ∈ FPathsG |
last(pi) ∈ Si} → Dist(A) such that, if σi(pi)(a)>0, then a ∈ A(last(pi)). The
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set of all strategies of player i ∈ Π is represented by ΣiG (when clear from the
context we will drop the subscript G). A strategy for player i is deterministic if
it always selects actions with probability 1, and memoryless if it makes the same
choice for any paths that end in the same state.
A strategy profile for G takes the form σ=〈σi〉i∈Π , listing a strategy for each
player. We use FPathsσ and IPathsσ for the sets of finite and infinite paths
corresponding to the choices made by the profile σ when starting in the initial
state. For a given profile σ, the behaviour of G is fully probabilistic and we can
define a probability measure Probσ over the set of infinite paths IPathsσ [31].
Properties. Two fundamental properties of quantitative models are the prob-
ability of reaching a set of target states and the expected price accumulated
before doing so. For a strategy profile σ and set of target states F of a TSG G,
the probability of reaching F and expected price accumulated before reaching
F from the initial state s¯ under the profile σ are given by the following (again,
when it is clear from the context, we will drop the subscript G):
PσG(F )
def
= Probσ({pi ∈ IPathsσ | pi(i) ∈ F for some i ∈ N})
EσG(F )
def
=
∫
pi∈IPathsσ rew(pi, F ) dProb
σ
where for any infinite path pi:
rew(pi, F )
def
=
∑kF
i=0R(pi(i), pi[i])
and kF= min{k−1 | pi(k) ∈ F} if pi(k) ∈ F for some k ∈ N and kF=∞ otherwise.
To quantify the above properties over the strategies of the players, we con-
sider a coalition C ⊆ Π who try to maximise the property of interest, while
the remaining players Π\C try to minimise it. Formally, we have the following
definition:
PCG (F )
def
= supσ1∈Σ1 infσ2∈Σ2 P
σ1,σ2
GC
(F )
ECG (F )
def
= supσ1∈Σ1 infσ2∈Σ2 E
σ1,σ2
GC
(F )
where GC is the two-player game constructed from G where the states controlled
by player 1 equal ∪i∈CSi and the states controlled by player 2 equal ∪i∈Π\CSi.
The above definition yields the optimal value of G if it is determined, i.e., if
the maximum value that the coalition C can ensure equals the minimum value
that the coalition Π \C can ensure. Formally, the definition of determinacy and
optimal strategies for probabilistic reachability properties of TSGs are given
below, and the case of expected reachability is analogous (replacing P with E).
Definition 2. For a TSG G, target F and coalition of players C, we say the
game GC is determined with respect to probabilistic reachability if:
supσ1∈Σ1 infσ2∈Σ2 P
σ1,σ2(F ) = infσ2∈Σ2 supσ1∈Σ1 P
σ1,σ2(F ) .
Furthermore, a strategy σ?1 ∈ Σ1 is optimal if Pσ
?
1 ,σ2(F ) > PCG (F ) for all σ2 ∈
Σ2 and strategy σ?2 ∈ Σ2 is optimal if Pσ1,σ
?
2 (F ) 6 PCG (F ) for all σ1 ∈ Σ1.
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As we shall demonstrate, the games we consider are determined with respect to
probabilistic and expected reachability, and optimal strategies exist. In particu-
lar, finite-state and finite-branching TSGs are determined [32] and efficient tech-
niques exist to approximate optimal values and optimal strategies [20,22]. These
techniques underlie the model checking algorithms for logics such as rPATL,
defined for TSGs and implemented in the tool PRISM-games [41].
3 Turn-based Probabilistic Timed Multi-Player Games
We now introduce turn-based probabilistic timed multi-player games (TPTGs), a
framework for modelling systems which allows probabilistic, non-deterministic,
real-time and competitive behaviour. Let T ∈ {R,N} be the time domain of
either the non-negative reals or natural numbers.
Clocks, valuations and clock constraints. We assume a finite set of clocks
X . A clock valuation is a function v : X → T; the set of all clock valuations is
denoted TX . Let 0 be the clock valuation that assigns the value 0 to all clocks.
For any set of clocks X ⊆ X and clock valuation v ∈ TX , let v[X:=0] be the
clock valuation such that, for any clock x, we have v[X:=0](x) equals 0 if x ∈ X
and v(x) otherwise. Furthermore, for any time instant t ∈ T, let v+t be the
clock valuation such that (v+t)(x) = v(x)+t for all x ∈ X . A closed, diagonal-
free clock constraint4 ζ is a conjunction of inequalities of the form x6c or x>c,
where x ∈ X and c ∈ N. We write v |= ζ if the clock valuation v satisfies the
clock constraint ζ and use CC (X ) for the set of all clock constraints over X .
We are now in a position to present the syntax and semantics of TPTGs.
Definition 3 (TPTG syntax). A turn-based probabilistic timed multi-player
game (TPTG) is a tuple P=(Π,L, l,X ,Act , 〈Li〉i∈Π , inv , enab, prob, r) where:
– Π is a finite set of players;
– L is a finite set of locations and l ∈ L is an initial location;
– X is a finite set of clocks;
– Act is a finite set of actions;
– 〈Li〉i∈Π is a partition of L;
– inv : L→ CC (X ) is an invariant condition;
– enab : L×A→ CC (X ) is an enabling condition;
– prob : L×A→ Dist(2X×L) is a (partial) probabilistic transition function;
– r = (rL, rAct) is a price structure where rL : L → N is a location price
function and rAct : L×Act → N an action price function.
As for PTAs [45], a state of a TPTG P is a location-clock valuation pair (l, v) such
that the clock valuation satisfies the invariant inv(l). The transition choice in
(l, v) is under the control of the player i where l ∈ Li. A transition is a time-action
pair (t, a) which represents letting time t elapse and then performing action a.
Time can elapse if the invariant of the current location remains continuously
4 A constraint is closed if does not contain strict inequalities and diagonal-free if there
are no inequalities of the form x−y ∼ c for x, y ∈ X , ∼∈ {<,6,>, >} and c ∈ N.
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Example
7
medium
x≤4
send
y≤24
send x≥1Ùy≤22
0.5timeout
y=24
x:=0
arrive1
1≤x≤2
t_out
true
done
true
0.5
x:=0 arrive2x=4
Fig. 1. An example TPTG
satisfied and action a can be performed only if the enabling condition is satisfied.
If action a is taken in location l, then the probability of moving to location
l′ and resetting the set of clocks X equals prob(l, a)(X, l′). TPTGs have both
location prices, which are accumulated at rate rL(l) when time passes in location
l, and action prices, where rAct(l, a) is accumulated when performing action a
in location l. Formally, the semantics of a TPTG is a TSG defined as follows.
Definition 4 (TPTG semantics). For any time domain T ∈ {R,N} and
TPTG P=(Π,L, l,X ,Act , 〈Li〉i∈Π , inv , enab, prob, r) the semantics of P with re-
spect to the time domain T is the TSG [[P]]T=(Π,S, s¯,A, 〈Si〉i∈Π , δ, R) where:
– S = {(l, v) ∈ L×TX | v |= inv(l)} and s¯ = (l,0);
– A = T×Act;
– Si = {(l, v) ∈ S | l ∈ Li} for i ∈ Π;
– for any (l, v) ∈ S and (t, a) ∈ A we have δ((l, v), (t, a)) = µ if and only if
v+t′ |= inv(l) for all 06t′6t, v+t |= enab(l, a) and for any (l′, v′) ∈ S:
µ(l′, v′) =
∑
X⊆X∧v′=(v+t)[X:=0]
prob(l, a)(X, l′)
– R((l, v), (t, a)) = t·rL(l) + rAct(l, a) for all (l, v) ∈ S and (t, a) ∈ A.
We follow the approach of [30,24,29] and use time-action pairs in the transi-
tion function of Definition 4. As explained in [29], this yields a more expressive
semantics than having separate time and action transitions.
Example 1. Consider the TPTG in Fig. 1 which represents a simple communi-
cation protocol. There are two players: the sender and the medium, with the
medium controlling the location medium and the sender all other locations. The
TPTG has two clocks: x is used to keep track of the time it takes to send a
message and y the elapsed time. In the initial location send , the sender waits
between 1 and 2 time units before sending the message. The message then passes
through the medium that can either delay the message for between 1 and 2 time
units after which it arrives with probability 0.5, or delay the message for 4 time
units after which it arrives with probability 1. If the message does not arrive,
then the sender tries to send it again until reaching a timeout after 24 time units.
As for PTAs, in the standard (dense-time) semantics for a TPTG the time
domain T equals R. This yields an infinite state model which is not amenable to
verification. One approach that yields a finite state representation used in the
case of PTAs is the digital clocks semantics [38]. This is based on replacing the
real-valued clocks with clocks taking only values from a bounded set of integers.
In order to give the definition for a TPTG P, for any clock x of P we define kx
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to be the greatest constant to which x is compared in the clock constraints of
P. This allows us to use bounded clock values since, if the value of the clock x
exceeds kx, then the exact value will not affect the satisfaction of the invariants
and enabling conditions of P, and therefore does not influence the behaviour.
Definition 5 (Digital clocks semantics). The digital clocks semantics of a
TPTG P, denoted [[P]]N, is obtained from Definition 4, by setting T equal to N
and for any v ∈ NX , t ∈ N and x ∈ X letting (v+t)(x) = min{v(x)+t, kx+1}.
We restrict our attention to time-divergent (also called non-Zeno) behaviour.
More precisely, we only consider strategies for the players that do not generate
unrealisable executions, i.e., executions in which time does not advance beyond
a certain point. We achieve this by restricting to TPTGs that satisfy the syn-
tactic conditions for PTAs given in [45], derived from results on TAs [51,53]. In
addition, we require the following assumptions to ensure the correctness of the
digital clocks semantics.
Assumption 1 For any TPTG P : (a) all invariants of P are bounded; (b) all
clock constraints are closed and diagonal free; (c) all probabilities are rational.
Regarding Assumption 1(a), in fact bounded TAs are as expressive as standard
TAs [9], and this result carries over to TPTGs.
To facilitate higher-level modelling, PTAs can be extended with parallel com-
position, discrete variables, urgent transitions and locations and resetting clocks
to integer values [45]. We can extend TPTGs in a similar way, and will use these
constructs in Section 5.
4 Correctness of the Digital Clocks Semantics
We now show that, under Assumption 1, optimal probabilistic and expected
price reachability values agree under the digital and dense-time semantics. As
for PTAs [45], by modifying the TPTG under study, we can reduce time-bounded
probabilistic reachability properties to probabilistic reachability properties and
both expected time-bounded cumulative price properties and expected time-
instant price properties to expected reachability properties. In each case the
modifications to the TPTG preserve Assumption 1, and therefore the digital
clocks semantics can also be used to verify these classes of properties.
For the remainder of this section, we fix a TPTG P, coalition of players C
and set of target locations F ⊆ L, and let FT = {(l, v) ∈ F×TX | v |= inv(l)} for
T ∈ {R,N}. We have omitted the proofs that closely follow those for PTAs [38].
The missing definitions and proofs can be found in Appendix A.
We first present results relating to the determinacy and existence of opti-
mal strategies for the games [[P]]CR and [[P]]
C
N and a correspondence between the
strategy profiles of [[P]]CN and [[P]]
C
R .
Proposition 1. For any TPTG P satisfying Assumption 1, the games [[P]]CR
and [[P]]CN are determined and have optimal strategies for both probabilistic and
expected price reachability properties.
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Proof. In the case of [[P]]CR , the result follows from [23] and Assumption 1, i.e.
since all clock constraints are closed. Considering [[P]]CN , the result follows from
the fact that the game has a finite state space and is finitely branching [32]. uunionsq
Proposition 2. For any strategy profile σ′ of [[P]]CN , there exists a strategy profile
σ of [[P]]CR such that Pσ(FR) = Pσ
′
(FN) and Eσ(FR) = Eσ
′
(FN).
Using the -digitization approach of TAs [26], which has been extended to PTAs
in [38], the following theorem follows, demonstrating the correctness of the digital
clocks semantics for probabilistic reachability properties.
Theorem 1. For any TPTG P satisfying Assumption 1, coalition of players C
and set of locations F ⊆ L : PC[[P]]R(FR) = PC[[P]]N(FN).
For expected price reachability properties, we extend the approach of [38], by
first showing that, for any fixed (dense-time) profile σ of [[P]]CR and n ∈ N, there
exist profiles of [[P]]CN whose expected price of reaching the target locations F
within n transitions that provide lower and upper bounds for that of σ.
For T ∈ {R,N}, profile σ of [[P]]CT , and finite path pi ∈ FPathsσ we inductively
define the values 〈Eσn(pi, FT)〉n∈N which equal the expected price, under the profile
σ, of reaching the target FT after initially performing the path pi within n steps.
To ease presentation we only give the definition for deterministic profiles.
Definition 6. For T ∈ {R,N}, strategy profile σ=(σ1, σ2) of [[P]]CT and finite
path pi of the profile let Eσ1,σ20 (pi, FT) = 0 and for any n ∈ N, if last(pi)=(l, v) ∈ Si
for 16i62, σi(pi)=(t, a) and µ = P[[P]]T((l, v), (t, a)), then:
Eσn+1(pi, FT) =
 0 if (l, v) ∈ FTrL(l)·t+ rAct(l, a) + ∑
s′∈S
µ(s′) · Eσn(pi t,a−−→ s′, FT) otherwise.
We require the following properties of these expected price reachability proper-
ties. These then allow us to prove the correctness of the digital clocks semantics
for expected price reachability properties (Theorem 2 below).
Lemma 1. For T ∈ {R,N} and profile σ of [[P]]CT , the sequence 〈Eσn(FT)〉n∈N is
non-decreasing and converges to Eσ(FT), and, for any player 1 strategy σ1 of
[[P]]CT , the sequence of functions Eσ1,·n (FT) : Σ2 → R converges uniformly. Fur-
thermore, for any player 1 strategy σ1, the sequence 〈infσ2∈Σ2 Eσ1,σ2n (FT)〉n∈N is
non-decreasing and converges to infσ2∈Σ2 Eσ1,σ2(FT), and the sequence of func-
tions infσ2∈Σ2 E·,σ2n (FT) : Σ1 → R converges uniformly.
Proof. In each case, proving that the sequence is non-decreasing and converges
follows from Definition 6. Uniform convergence follows from showing the set of
strategies for players is compact and using the fact that the sequences are non-
decreasing and converge pointwise [48, Theorem 7.13]. In the case when T=N,
compactness follows from the fact the action set is finite, while for T=R we must
restrict to PTAs for which all invariants are bounded (Assumption 1) to ensure
the action set is compact. uunionsq
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Lemma 2. For any strategy profile σ of [[P]]CR and n ∈ N, there exist strategy
profiles σlb and σub of [[P]]CN such that: Eσ
lb
n (FN) 6 Eσn(FR) 6 Eσ
ub
n (FN).
Theorem 2. For any TPTG P satisfying Assumption 1, coalition of players C
and set of locations F ⊆ L : EC[[P]]R(FR) = EC[[P]]N(FN).
Proof. Consider any n ∈ N. Using Lemma 2 it follows that, for any profile
σ=(σ1, σ2) of [[P]]R, there exist profiles σlb=(σlb1 , σ
lb
1 ) and σ
ub=(σub1 , σ
ub
1 ) of [[P]]
C
N
such that:
Eσ
lb
1 ,σ
lb
2
n (FN) 6 Eσ1,σ2n (FR) 6 E
σub1 ,σ
ub
2
n (FN) .
On the other hand, using the construction in the proof of Proposition 2, for any
profile σ′=(σ′1, σ
′
2) of [[P]]N, there exists a profile σ=(σ1, σ1) of [[P]]
C
R such that:
Eσ1,σ2n (FN) = E
σ′1,σ
′
2
n (FR) .
Combining these results with Proposition 1 it follows that:
supσ′1∈Σ1[[P]]CN
infσ′2∈Σ2[[P]]CN
Eσ
′
1,σ
′
2
n (FN) = supσ1∈Σ1
[[P]]CR
infσ2∈Σ2
[[P]]CR
Eσ1,σ2n (FR) .
Since n ∈ N was arbitrary, we have:
lim
n→∞ supσ′1∈Σ1[[P]]CN
infσ′2∈Σ2[[P]]CN
Eσ
′
1,σ
′
2
n (FN) = lim
n→∞ supσ1∈Σ1[[P]]CR
infσ2∈Σ2
[[P]]CR
Eσ1,σ2n (FR)
and hence using Lemma 1 it follows that:
supσ′1∈Σ1[[P]]CN
infσ′2∈Σ2[[P]]CN
Eσ′1,σ′2(FN) = supσ1∈Σ1
[[P]]CR
infσ2∈Σ2
[[P]]CR
Eσ1,σ2(FR) .
The fact that the limit can move inside the sup and inf operators on both sides
of the inequality follows from the uniform convergence results of Lemma 1. uunionsq
5 Case Studies
In this section, we apply our approach to two case studies, a security protocol and
a scheduling problem, both of which have been previously modelled as PTAs [38].
In both case studies, by working with games we are able to give more realistic
models that overcome the limitations of the earlier PTA models. We specify
the finite-state TSG digital clocks semantic models of the case studies using
the PRISM language and employ the PRISM-games tool [41] to perform the
analysis. Using PRISM-games we are not only able to find optimal probabilistic
and expected reachability values, but also synthesise optimal strategies for the
players. PRISM files for the case studies are available from [54].
Non-repudiation protocol. Markowitch and Roggeman’s non-repudiation pro-
tocol for information transfer [44] is designed to allow an originator O to transfer
information to a recipient R while guaranteeing non-repudiation, that is, neither
O nor R can deny that they participated in the transfer.
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Originator
1
init
true
mess
x≤MD
wait
x≤AD
rec
x:=0
send
x≥ad
done
true
ack1−p p
t_out
x≥AD
error
true
x:=0
x≤AD
(a) Originator
Honest recipient
2
wait
true
init
y≤0
rec send
y:=0
y≥ad
ack
ack
truey=0
(b) Honest recipient
Fig. 2. PTAs used to model the non-repudiation protocol
Randomisation is fundamental to the protocol as, in the initialisation step,
O randomly selects a positive integer N that is never revealed to R during
execution. Timing is also fundamental as, to prevent R potentially gaining an
advantage, if O does not receive an acknowledgement within a specific time-
out value (denoted AD), the protocol is stopped and O states R is trying to
cheat. In previous PTA models of the protocol [42,45] the originator O had fixed
behaviour, while the choices of a (malicious) recipient R included varying the
delay between receiving a message from O and sending an acknowledgement.
By modelling the protocol as a two-player game we can allow both O and R to
make choices which can depend on the history, i.e., the previous behaviour of
the parties. The game is naturally turn-based since, in each round, first O sends
a message after a delay of their choosing and, after receiving this message, R
can respond with an acknowledgement after a delay of their choosing.
We first consider an ‘honest’ version of the protocol where both O and R can
choose delays for their messages but do follow the protocol (i.e., send messages
and acknowledgements before timeouts occur). The component PTA models for
O and R are presented in Fig. 2. In the PTA for O, the message delay is between
md=2 and MD=9 time units, while the acknowledgement delay is at least ad=1
time units and AD=5 is the timeout value. In addition, the probabilistic choice
of N is made using a geometric distribution with parameter p ∈ (0, 1]. The
parallel composition of these two components then gives the TPTG model of
the protocol by assigning control of locations to either O or R, based on which
party decides on the delay. There is a complication in the location where O
is waiting and R is sending an acknowledgement, as the delay before sending
the acknowledgement controlled by R, while if the timeout is reached O should
end the protocol. However, since O’s behaviour is deterministic in this location,
we assign this location to be under the control of R, but add the constraints
that an acknowledgement can only be sent before the timeout is reached. If O’s
behaviour was not deterministic, then a turn-based model would not be sufficient
and the protocol would need to be modelled as a concurrent game.
We also consider two ‘malicious’ versions of the protocol, one in which R is
allowed to guess which is the last message (malicious version 1) and a version
further extended by giving R additional power through a probabilistic decoder
that can decode a message with probability 0.25 before O will timeout (malicious
version 2). The TPTG models follow the same structure as that for the ‘honest’
version, requiring that, in the locations where O is waiting for an acknowledge-
ment, once the timeout has been reached the only possible behaviour is for the
protocol to terminate and O states R is trying to cheat.
Verification and Control of Turn-Based Probabilistic Real-Time Games 11
Fig. 3.Max. probability the protocol terminates successfully by time T (honest version)
Fig. 4. Min. expected time until the protocol terminates successfully (honest version)
For the ‘honest’ version, Figures 3 and 4 present results when different coali-
tions try to maximise the probability the protocol terminates successfully by
time T when p=0.01 and p=0.1 and minimise expected time for successful ter-
mination as the parameter p varies. More precisely, we consider the coalition of
both players (〈〈O,R〉〉), a single player (〈〈O〉〉 or 〈〈R〉〉) and the empty coalition
(〈〈〉〉). Using a PTA model, only the first and last cases could be considered. As
can be seen, both parties have some control over the time it takes for the proto-
col to complete and O has greater power as it can delay messages longer than R
(if R delays too long then O will terminate the protocol stating R is cheating).
In the case of the versions with a malicious recipient, in Figures 5 and 6
we have plotted the maximum probability the recipient gains information by
time T for versions 1 and 2 respectively. We have included the cases where O
works against R (〈〈R〉〉) and where they collaborate (〈〈O,R〉〉). As we can see,
although O cannot reduce the probability of R obtaining information, it can to
some extent increase the time it takes R to obtain this information.
Processor Task Scheduling. This case study is based on the task-graph
scheduling problem from [12]. The task-graph is given in Fig. 7 and is for eval-
uating the expression D×(C×(A+B))+((A+B)+(C×D)) where each multipli-
cation and addition is evaluated on one of two processors, P1 and P2. The time
and energy required to perform these operations is different, with P1 being faster
than P2 while consuming more energy as detailed below.
– Time and energy usage of P1: [0, 2] picoseconds for addition, [0, 3] picoseconds
multiplication, 10 Watts when idle and 90 Watts when active.
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Fig. 5. Maximum probability R gains information by time T (malicious version 1)
Fig. 6. Maximum probability R gains information by time T (malicious version 2)
– Time and energy usage of P2: [0, 5] picoseconds for addition, [0, 7] picoseconds
multiplication, 20 Watts when idle and 30 Watts when active.
A (non-probabilistic) TA model is considered in [12], which is the parallel com-
position of a TA for each processor and for the scheduler. Previously, in [45],
we extended this model by adding probabilistic behaviour to give a PTA. How-
ever, the execution time of the processors had to remain fixed since the non-
determinism was under the control of the scheduler, and therefore the optimal
scheduler would always choose the minimum execution time for each operation.
By moving to a TPTG model, we can allow the execution times to be under the
control of a separate player (the environment). We further extend the model by
allowing the processors P1 and P2 to have at most k1 and k2 faults respectively.
We assume that the probability of any fault causing a failure is p and faults can
happen at any time a processor is active, i.e., the time the faults occur is under
the control of the environment. Again, we could not model this extension with a
PTA, since the scheduler would then be in control of when the faults occurred,
and therefore could decide that no faults would occur.
As explained in [12], an optimal schedule for a game model in which delays
can vary does not yield a simple assignment of tasks to processors at specific
times as presented in [45] for PTAs, but instead it is an assignment that also
has as input when previous tasks were completed and on which processors.
In Fig. 8 we present both the original TA model for processor P1, in which
the execution time is non-deterministic, and the extended PTA, which allows k1
faults and where the probability of a fault causing a failure equals p. The PTA
includes an integer variable faults and the missing enabling conditions equal
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Fig. 7. Task graph for computing D×(C×(A+B))+((A+B)+(C×D))
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Fig. 8. PTAs for the task-graph scheduling case study
true. To specify the automaton for the scheduler and ensure that we can then
build a turn-based game, we restrict the scheduler so that it decides what tasks
to schedule initially and immediately after a task ends, then passes control to
the environment, which decides the time for the next active task to end.
In Fig. 9 we have plotted both the optimal expected time and energy when
there are different number of faults in each processor as the parameter p (the
probability of a fault causing a failure) varies. As would be expected, both the
optimal expected time and energy consumption increases both as the number of
faults increases and the probability that a fault causes a failure increases.
Considering the synthesised optimal schedulers for the expected time case,
when k1=k2=1 and p=1, the optimal approach is to just use the faster processor
P1 and the expected time equals 18.0. The optimal strategy for the environment,
i.e., the choices that yield the worst-case expected time, against this scheduler
is to delay all tasks as long as possible and cause a fault when a multiplication
task is just about to complete on P1 (recall P2 is never used under the optimal
scheduler). A multiplication is chosen as this takes longer (3 picoseconds) than
an addition task (2 picoseconds). These choices can be seen through the fact
that 18.0 is the time for 4 multiplications and 3 additions to be performed on
P1, while the problem requires 3 multiplications and 3 additions. As soon as the
probability of a fault causing a failure is less than 1, the optimal scheduler does
use processor P2 from the beginning by initially scheduling task1 on process P1
and task2 on processor P2 (which is also optimal when no faults can occur).
In the case of the expected energy consumption, the optimal scheduler uses
both processes unless one has 2 or more faults than the other and there is only
a small chance that a fault will cause a failure. For example, if P1 has 3 faults
and P2 has 1 fault, then P1 is only used by the optimal scheduler when the
probability of a failure causing a fault is approximately 0.25 or less.
6 Conclusions
We have introduced turn-based probabilistic timed games and shown that digital
clocks are sufficient for analysing a large class of such games and performance
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Fig. 9. Minimum expected time and energy to complete all tasks (k2=k1)
properties. We have demonstrated the feasibility of the approach through two
case studies. However, there are limitations of the method since, in particular, as
for PTAs [38], the digital clocks semantics does not preserve stopwatch properties
or general (nested) temporal logic specifications.
We are investigating extending the approach to concurrent probabilistic timed
games. However, since such games are not determined for expected reachability
properties [24], this is not straightforward. One direction is to find a class of
games which are determined. If we are able to find such a class, then the ex-
tension of PRISM-games to concurrent stochastic games [36] could be used to
verify this class. Work on finite-state concurrent stochastic games has recently
been extended to the case when players have distinct objectives [37] and consid-
ering such objectives in the real-time case is also a direction of future research.
Another direction of future research is to formulate a zone-based approach
for verifying probabilistic timed games. For the case of probabilistic reachability,
this appears possible through the approach of [33] for PTAs. However, it is less
clear that the techniques for expected time [29] and expected prices [35], and
temporal logic specifications [40] for PTAs, can be extended to TPTGs. Finally,
we mention that, although the PRISM language models used in Section 5 were
built by hand, in future we plan to automate this procedure, extending the one
already implemented in PRISM [34] for PTAs.
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A Proofs from Section 4
In this appendix we include the details omitted from Section 4 as they closely
follow those for PTAs presented in [38]. As in Section 4, we fix a TPTG P,
coalition of players C and target set of locations F ∈ L, and let FT = {(l, v) ∈
F×TX | v |= inv(l)} be the target of game [[P]]T for T ∈ {R,N}.
We first prove Proposition 2, i.e. that for any strategy profile of [[P]]CN there
is a corresponding strategy profile of [[P]]CR .
Proof (of Proposition 2). Consider any strategy profile σ′=(σ′1, σ
′
2) of [[P]]
C
N . We
can construction the strategy profile σ=(σ1, σ2) of [[P]]
C
R where the strategies
σ1 and σ2 make the same choices as those of σ
′
1 and σ
′
2 respectively. The only
difference is in the states reached as values of a clocks in [[P]]R are not bounded.
It then follows that Pσ(FR) = Pσ
′
(FN) and Eσ(FR) = Eσ
′
(FN) as required. uunionsq
We now presenting definitions and results for PTAs [45] and TAs [25,26] used in
proving the correctness of the digital clocks semantics.
Definition 7. For any t ∈ R and ε ∈ [0, 1] let:
[t]ε =
{ btc if t 6 btc+ ε
dte otherwise.
Lemma 3. For any t, t′ ∈ R, c ∈ N and ∼∈ {6,=,>}, if t − t′ ∼ c then
[t]ε − [t′]ε ∼ c for all ε ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 8. For any infinite path s0
t0,a0−−−→ s1 t1,a1−−−→ · · · of [[P]]T, the accumu-
lated duration up to the (n+1)th state of pi is defined by dur(pi, n) =
∑n−1
i=0 ti.
Lemma 4. For any path pi = (l0, v0)
t0,a0−−−→ (l1, v1) t1,a1−−−→ · · · of [[P]]CR , x ∈ X
and i ∈ N, there exists j 6 i such that vi(x) = dur(pi, i)− dur(pi, j).
Definition 9. For any (finite or infinite) path pi = (l¯,0)
t0,a0−−−→ (l1, v1) t1,a1−−−→ · · ·
of [[P]]CR , its ε-digitization is the path
[pi]ε = (l¯,0)
t′1,a0−−−→ (l1, [v1]ε) t
′
1,a1−−−→ · · ·
of [[P]]CN where for any i ∈ N and x ∈ X :
– [vi]ε(x) = min([dur(pi, i)]ε− [dur(pi, j)]ε, kx + 1) and j 6 i such that vi(x) =
dur(pi, i)− dur(pi, j) which exists by Lemma 4;
– t′i = [dur(pi, i+1)]ε − [dur(pi, i)]ε.
The correctness of this construction is dependent on the clock constraints ap-
pearing in P being closed and diagonal-free (Assumption 1).
We next extend the notion of digitization to strategy profiles of [[P]]CR . Follow-
ing [38], to achieve this we define the digitization of sets of paths, i.e. for a set of
paths Π, we let [Π]ε
def
= {[pi]ε | pi ∈ Π}. When considering a strategy profile σ of
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[[P]]CR , we assume the domain of the mapping [·]ε is restricted to the sets of paths
IPathsσ and FPathsσ. Furthermore, for any set of finite paths Π ⊆ FPathsσ let:
Probσ(Π) = Probσ({pi′ ∈ IPathsσ | ∃pi ∈ Π. (pi is a prefix of pi′)})
and for any finite path pi ∈ FPathsσ, 16i62 and (t, a) ∈ A(last(pi)) let:
pi
t,a−−→ def= {pi′ ∈ FPathsσ | ∃s ∈ S. (pi′ = pi t,a−−→ s)} .
Definition 10. For any strategy profile σ=(σ1, σ2) of [[P]]
C
R and ε ∈ [0, 1] its
ε-digitization strategy profile σε=(σε1, σ
ε
2) of [[P]]
C
N is defined as follows. For any
finite path pi of [[P]]CN and 16i62 such that last(pi) ∈ Si :
– if [pi]−1ε is non-empty, then for any (t, a) ∈ A(last(pi)), then the probability
of σεi choosing (t, a) after pi has been performed is given by
σεi (pi)(t, a) =
Probσ([pi
t,a−−→ ]−1ε )
Probσ([pi]−1ε )
– if [pi]−1ε is the empty set, then let σ
ε
i choose an arbitrary element of A(last(pi)).
We next show how probability measures of strategy profiles change under ε-
digitization.
Proposition 3. For any strategy profile σ of [[P]]CR and ε ∈ [0, 1], we have
Probσ
ε
(Ω) = Probσ([Ω]−1ε ) for all elements Ω of the σ-algebra of the proba-
bility measure Probσ
ε
.
Proof. Consider any strategy profile σ=(σ1, σ2) of [[P]]
C
R and ε ∈ [0, 1]. Using
Definition 10 we can build the strategy profile σε=(σε1, σ
ε
2) of [[P]]
C
N . Now, from
the construction of Probσ
ε
, see [31], it is sufficient to show that:
Probσ
ε
(pi) = Probσ([pi]−1ε ) for all pi ∈ FPathsσ
ε
(1)
which we prove by induction on the length of pi. Therefore, consider any path
pi ∈ IPathsσε . If |pi|=0, then pi=s¯ and Probσε(pi) = 1 = Probσ([pi]−1ε ) as required.
Next, suppose |pi|=n+1 and by induction the lemma holds for all paths of
length n. Now, pi is of the form pi′
t,a−−→ s′ for some path pi′ of length n, (t, a) ∈
A(last(pi′)) and s′ ∈ S. Now last(pi′) ∈ Si for some 16i62, and therefore by
construction of Probσ
ε
supposing δ(last(pi′), (t, a)) = µ:
Probσ
ε
(pi) = Probσ
ε
(pi′) · σεi (pi′)(a) · µ(s′)
= Probσ([pi′]−1ε ) · σεi (pi′)(t, a) · µ(s′) by induction
= Probσ([pi′]−1ε ) ·
Probσ([pi′
t,a−−→ ]−1ε )
Probσ([pi′]−1ε )
· µ(s′) by Definition 10
= Probσ([pi′
t,a−−→ ]−1ε ) · µ(s′) rearranging
= Probσ{pi ∈ FPathsσ1,σ2 | [pi]ε = pi′ t,a−−→ s′} by definition of Probσ
= Probσ([pi]−1ε ) by construction of pi
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and hence (1) holds by induction. uunionsq
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 1, i.e. PC[[P]]R(FR) = P
C
[[P]]N
(FN).
Proof (of Theorem 1). Consider any TPTG P satisfying Assumption 1, coalition
of players C and set of locations F ⊆ L. From Definition 9, we have that:
pi(i) ∈ FR if and only if [pi]ε(i) ∈ FN for any path pi of [[P]]CR and i ∈ N. (2)
Now for any strategy profile σ=(σ1, σ2) of [[P]]
C
R , by definition of Pσ(FR):
Pσ(FR) = Probσ({pi ∈ IPathsσ | pi(i) ∈ F for some i ∈ N})
= Probσ
′
([{pi ∈ IPathsσ | pi(i) ∈ F for some i ∈ N}]−1ε ) (3)
for some strategy profile σ′=(σ′1, σ
′
2) of [[P]]
C
N using Proposition 3. Combining (3)
with (2) it follows that:
Pσ(FR) = Probσ{pi ∈ IPathsσ
′ | pi(i) ∈ F for some i ∈ N}
= Pσ
′
(FN) by definition of Pσ
′
(FN).
Since the player 2 strategy σ2 was arbitrary it follows that:
infσ2∈Σ2
[[P]]CR
Pσ1,σ2(FR) > infσ′2∈Σ2[[P]]CN
Pσ
′
1,σ
′
2(FN) .
Following dual arguments and using Proposition 2 we have:
infσ2∈Σ2
[[P]]CR
Pσ1,σ2(FR) 6 infσ′2∈Σ2[[P]]CN
Pσ
′
1,σ
′
2(FN)
and therefore:
infσ2∈Σ2
[[P]]CR
Pσ1,σ2(FR) = infσ′2∈Σ2[[P]]CN
Pσ
′
1,σ
′
2(FN) .
We can now apply similar arguments again to yield:
supσ1∈Σ1
[[P]]CR
infσ2∈Σ2
[[P]]CR
Pσ1,σ2(FR) = supσ′1∈Σ1[[P]]CN
infσ′2∈Σ2[[P]]CN
Pσ
′
1,σ
′
2(FN)
as required. uunionsq
To give the proof of Lemma 2, we first require the following results from linear
programming.
Definition 11. A matrix A is totally unimodular if each subdeterminant of A
is 0, +1 or −1.
Theorem 3 ([50] Theorem 19.3). Let A be a matrix with entries 0, +1 and
−1. Then the following are equivalent:
1. A is totally unimodular;
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2. each collection of columns of A can be split into two parts so that the sum
of the columns in one part minus the sum of the columns in the other part
is a vector with entries only 0, +1 and −1.
Theorem 4 ([50] Corollary 19.1.a). Let A be a totally unimodular matrix,
and let b and c be integral vectors. Then both problems in the linear programming
duality equation:
max{cx | x>0 ∧Ax6b} = min{yb | y>0 ∧ yA>c}
have integral optimum solutions.
We also require a variant of Definition 6 which considers only action prices.
Definition 12. For T ∈ {R,N}, strategy profile σ=(σ1, σ2) of [[P]]CT and finite
path pi of the profile let Aσ1,σ20 (pi, FT) = 0 and for any n ∈ N, if last(pi)=(l, v) ∈ Si
for 16i62, σi(pi)=(t, a) and µ = P[[P]]T((l, v), (t, a)), then:
Aσn+1(pi, FT) =
 0 if (l, v) ∈ FTrAct(l, a) + ∑
s′∈S
µ(s′) · Aσn(pi t,a−−→ s′, FT) otherwise.
We are now in a position to prove Lemma 2, i.e. for any strategy profile σ of
[[P]]CR and n ∈ N, there exist strategy profiles σlb and σub of [[P]]CN such that:
Eσ
lb
n (FN) 6 Eσn(FR) 6 Eσ
ub
n (FN) .
Proof (of Lemma 2). Consider any strategy profile σ=(σ1, σ2) of [[P]]
C
R . The first
part of the proof involves constructing a set of constraints on the time steps of
the strategy profiles that follow the same action choices as σ up until the nth
step. Using these constraints we then formulate a linear programming problem,
whose objective is either to maximise or minimise the expected price of reaching
a set of target states within n steps. The result then follows from showing that
there exist integer solutions which achieve the maximum and minimum values.
Below, we consider only the construction of the strategy profile σub=(σub1 , σ
ub
2 )
as the construction of the profile σlb1 follows similarly.
We begin by constructing a set of linear constraints from which we can derive
a set of strategy profiles that make the same choices as σ1. More precisely, we
consider any sequence of real values t = 〈tpi〉pi∈FPathsσ which satisfy, for any
pi ∈ FPathsσ, the following constraints:
– if |pi| = 0, then
tpi > 0 (4a)
−tpi > 0 (4b)
– if |pi| > 0, then
tpi − tpi(k) > bdur(pi, |pi|)− dur(pi, k)c for all k < |pi| (4c)
−tpi + tpi(k) > −ddur(pi, |pi|) + dur(pi, k)e for all k < |pi| (4d)
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Sequences of values which satisfy these constraints include letting tpi equal
dur(pi, |pi|) or [dur(pi, |pi|)]ε for any ε ∈ [0, 1].
Now suppose that we fix a sequence of real values t which satisfy the above
constraints. From these values we can construct the choices of a strategy profile
(σt1, σ
t
2) which match the action choices of the profile σ, although the durations
may differ. The set of finite paths of the profile (σt1, σ
t
2) when starting from the
initial state is given by {[pi]t | pi ∈ FPathsσ1,σ2}, which we define inductively as
follows:
– if pi = (l,0), then [pi]t = pi;
– if pi is of the form pi′
t,a−−→ (l, v), then:
[pi]t
def
= [pi′]t
t′,a−−→ (l, v′)
where t′ = tpi − tpi′ and for any clock x we have v′(x) = tpi − tpi(j) for j 6 |pi|
such that v(x) = dur(pi, |pi|)− dur(pi, j), which exists by Lemma 4.
The construction all finite paths of the profile (σt1, σ
t
2) yields also the choices
made by the profile and by construction the action choices match those of the
profile σ although the durations may differ. The fact that these choices are valid
choices of [[P]]CR follows from Lemma 4, equations (4a)–(4d) and since we restrict
attention to closed, diagonal-free probabilistic timed games (Assumption 1).
For any state (l, v) ∈ S, to simplify the presentation let rL(l, v) = rL(l). Now,
from the construction of the choices of (σt1, σ
t
2) and Definition 6 and Definition 12,
it follows that Eσ
t
1,σ
t
2
n (FR) equals:∑
pi∈FPathsσ∧|pi|6n
∧∀i6|pi|. pi(i) 6∈FR
Probσ
t
1,σ
t
2(pi) · (tpi−tpi|pi|−1) · rL(last(pi)) + Aσ
t
1,σ
t
2
n (FR)
=
∑
pi∈FPathsσ∧|pi|6n
∧∀i6|pi|. pi(i) 6∈FR
Probσ(pi) · (tpi−tpi|pi|−1) · rL(last(pi)) + Aσn(FR) (5)
since the action choices of σ and (σt1, σ
t
2) are the same.
Now suppose we fix some n ∈ N and consider the following linear program-
ming problem over the variables 〈tpi〉pi∈FPathsσn , where FPathsσn is subset of paths
of FPathsσ with length at most n: maximise (5) such that the constraints of
(4a)–(4d) are satisfied. From Assumption 1 we have that all probabilities are
rational, and therefore we can scale the objective function such that it contains
only integer values. Furthermore, from the construction of the constraints the
corresponding matrix is totally unimodular (using Theorem 3 and the fact that,
for any collection of columns of the constraint matrix, the sum of the columns is
a vector with entries only 0, +1 and −1). Therefore, using Theorem 4, it follows
that the maximum solution is achieved by an integer vector. More precisely, there
exists a strategy profile σub=(σub1 , σ
ub
2 ) of [[P]]
C
N such that Eσn(FR) 6 Eσ
ub
n (FN) as
required. uunionsq
